Dear scheduling researcher,
We are delighted to announce the talk given by Leah Epstein (University
of Haifa).
The title is "The benefit of preemption".
The seminar will take place on Zoom on Wednesday, September 29 at 13:00 UTC.
Join Zoom Meeting
https://cesnet.zoom.us/j/97989356749?pwd=T2NzMkszN2Y1RDNNZExTc3p0SjJDdz09
<https://cesnet.zoom.us/j/97989356749?pwd=T2NzMkszN2Y1RDNNZExTc3p0SjJDdz09>
Meeting ID: 979 8935 6749
Passcode: 307940
You can follow the seminar online or offline on our Youtube channel as well:
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCUoCNnaAfw5NAntItILFn4A
The abstract follows.
Given an input of a scheduling problem, any non-preemptive solution for
it can be used as a preemptive solution. Thus, the optimal cost of a
preemptive solution is not larger than that of an optimal non-preemptive
solution. As preemption comes at a cost in real-life applications, it is
of interest to find the worst-case ratio between the two costs. For a
given problem, the supremum ratio over all possible inputs of the ratio
between the two costs (of an optimal solution without preemption and an
optimal solution that possibly uses preemption) is called the power or
benefit of preemption. While many scheduling variants can be studied
with respect to this measure, we will focus on the cases of a single
machine, parallel identical machines, and uniformly related machines,
and we will discuss the objectives of makespan and total (weighted)
completion time. We will exhibit how one can benefit from preemption,
and we will analyze the resulting worst case ratios for several basic
models.
The next talk in our series will be given by
Federico Della Croce (DIGEP - Polito.it) | October 13 | The Longest
Processing Time Rule for Identical Parallel Machines Revisited.
For more details, please visit https://schedulingseminar.com/
With kind regards
Zdenek, Mike and Guohua
--
Zdenek Hanzalek
Industrial Informatics Department,
Czech Institute of Informatics, Robotics and Cybernetics,
Czech Technical University in Prague,
Jugoslavskych partyzanu 1580/3, 160 00 Prague 6, Czech Republic
https://rtime.ciirc.cvut.cz/~hanzalek/
Dear scheduling researcher,
We are delighted to announce the talk given by Nicholas G. Hall (The
Ohio State University).
The title is "Dynamic Opponent Choice in Tournaments".
The seminar will take place on Zoom on Wednesday, September 15 at 13:00 UTC.
Join Zoom Meeting
https://cesnet.zoom.us/j/99180641475?pwd=WkpNS1NkVXNCcnVzdURqSzU1YXM3QT09
<https://cesnet.zoom.us/j/99180641475?pwd=WkpNS1NkVXNCcnVzdURqSzU1YXM3QT09>
Meeting ID: 991 8064 1475
Passcode: 994980
You can follow the seminar online or offline on our Youtube channel as well:
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCUoCNnaAfw5NAntItILFn4A
The abstract follows.
We propose an alternative design for tournaments that use a preliminary
stage, followed by several rounds of single elimination play. Most U.S.
major sports, for example, are organized in this way. However, the
conventional "bracket" design of these tournaments suffers from several
deficiencies. First, top ranked players randomly incur unfortunate
matchups against other players, which introduces an unnecessary element
of luck. Second, as documented in the tournament design literature,
various reasonable criteria such as stronger ranked players having a
higher probability of winning, are not satisfied. Third, the probability
that the top two players meet is not maximized. Fourth, there is the
widely observed issue of shirking at the preliminary stage, where a
player loses deliberately to obtain an easier path through the
tournament. Finally, the use of a conventional fixed bracket fails to
allow players to consider information that develops during the
tournament, such as injuries to other players. To address all these
issues, we allow higher ranked players at the single elimination stage
to choose their next opponent at each round. We allow each player's
ranking either to remain static, or to improve from beating a higher
ranked player. Using data from 1,902 men's professional tennis
tournaments from 2001-2016, we demonstrate the reasonableness of the
results obtained. We also perform sensitivity analysis for the effect of
increasing irregularity in the pairwise win probability matrix on three
traditional performance measures. Finally, we show that our opponent
choice design reduces shirking, and could have eliminated it in some
notorious situations. In summary, compared with the conventional design,
the opponent choice design provides higher probabilities that the best
player wins and also that the two best players meet, reduces shirking,
and performs well for preservation of ranking.
The next talk in our series will be given by
Leah Epstein (University of Haifa) | September 29 | The benefit of
preemption.
For more details, please visit https://schedulingseminar.com/
With kind regards
Zdenek, Mike and Guohua
--
Zdenek Hanzalek
Industrial Informatics Department,
Czech Institute of Informatics, Robotics and Cybernetics,
Czech Technical University in Prague,
Jugoslavskych partyzanu 1580/3, 160 00 Prague 6, Czech Republic
https://rtime.ciirc.cvut.cz/~hanzalek/
Dear scheduling researcher,
We are delighted to announce the talk given by Nicholas G. Hall (The
Ohio State University).
The title is "Dynamic Opponent Choice in Tournaments".
The seminar will take place on Zoom on Wednesday, September 15 at 13:00 UTC.
Join Zoom Meeting
https://cesnet.zoom.us/j/99180641475?pwd=WkpNS1NkVXNCcnVzdURqSzU1YXM3QT09
<https://cesnet.zoom.us/j/99180641475?pwd=WkpNS1NkVXNCcnVzdURqSzU1YXM3QT09>
Meeting ID: 991 8064 1475
Passcode: 994980
You can follow the seminar online or offline on our Youtube channel as well:
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCUoCNnaAfw5NAntItILFn4A
The abstract follows.
We propose an alternative design for tournaments that use a preliminary
stage, followed by several rounds of single elimination play. Most U.S.
major sports, for example, are organized in this way. However, the
conventional "bracket" design of these tournaments suffers from several
deficiencies. First, top ranked players randomly incur unfortunate
matchups against other players, which introduces an unnecessary element
of luck. Second, as documented in the tournament design literature,
various reasonable criteria such as stronger ranked players having a
higher probability of winning, are not satisfied. Third, the probability
that the top two players meet is not maximized. Fourth, there is the
widely observed issue of shirking at the preliminary stage, where a
player loses deliberately to obtain an easier path through the
tournament. Finally, the use of a conventional fixed bracket fails to
allow players to consider information that develops during the
tournament, such as injuries to other players. To address all these
issues, we allow higher ranked players at the single elimination stage
to choose their next opponent at each round. We allow each player's
ranking either to remain static, or to improve from beating a higher
ranked player. Using data from 1,902 men's professional tennis
tournaments from 2001-2016, we demonstrate the reasonableness of the
results obtained. We also perform sensitivity analysis for the effect of
increasing irregularity in the pairwise win probability matrix on three
traditional performance measures. Finally, we show that our opponent
choice design reduces shirking, and could have eliminated it in some
notorious situations. In summary, compared with the conventional design,
the opponent choice design provides higher probabilities that the best
player wins and also that the two best players meet, reduces shirking,
and performs well for preservation of ranking.
The next talk in our series will be given by
Leah Epstein (University of Haifa) | September 29 | The benefit of
preemption.
For more details, please visit https://schedulingseminar.com/
With kind regards
Zdenek, Mike and Guohua
--
Zdenek Hanzalek
Industrial Informatics Department,
Czech Institute of Informatics, Robotics and Cybernetics,
Czech Technical University in Prague,
Jugoslavskych partyzanu 1580/3, 160 00 Prague 6, Czech Republic
https://rtime.ciirc.cvut.cz/~hanzalek/